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First version received April 1991; final version accepted February 1992 (Eds.) 
This paper is a study of the dynamics of  the efficient distribution of  consumption  in an 
exchange economy with many consumers, each of whom is subject to private, idiosyncratic taste 
shocks.  We  propose  a  recursive  method  for  finding  feasible  allocations  that  are  incentive- 
compatible and that are Pareto optimal within this set. The method is applied to several parametric 
examples.  We find that in an efficient allocation  the degree of inequality continually increases, 
with a diminishing fraction of the population  receiving an increasing fraction of the resources. 
We discuss the extent to which these allocations  can be decentralized via market arrangements. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an 
exchange  economy  with  private information.  The  economy  we  study  has  a  constant 
endowment  flow of  a single,  non-storable  consumption  good  which  is to be  allocated 
each period among a large number of consumers. Each period, these consumers experience 
unpredictable, idiosyncratic, privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility 
of  current consumption.  Efficiency dictates that more resources be  allocated  to  those 
consumers who, in any given period, have a high marginal utility of current consumption, 
due to a high value of their taste shock.  But since individual shocks are not observable, 
the efficient allocation  of  resources in this environment is impeded  by the problem of 
incentive compatibility: if consumers who report a high value of the taste shock receive 
more current consumption, then all other consumers have an incentive to misreport their 
current taste shock to receive the same treatment. 
The problem of incentive compatibility is solved in this environment by conditioning 
each consumer's consumption allocation not only on his current report of his taste shock, 
but also on the history of his past reports. In particular, it is possible to induce consumers 
to report their taste shocks truthfully by promising agents who  report that they have a 
high marginal utility of  consumption  in the current period that they will receive more 
current consumption at the expense of less consumption in future periods, and promising 
agents who  report a low  marginal utility of  current consumption  that they will receive 
higher consumption in future periods at the expense of less current consumption.  Thus, 
incentive compatible allocations in this environment induce dynamics in the distribution 
of consumption  that are absent in a full-information  environment.  Our concern in this 
paper is to examine the dynamics of the distribution of consumption that may be induced 
by the need for incentive compatibility. 
It is  possible  to  construct  a wide  variety of  command  or market mechanisms  to 
implement  incentive  compatible  allocations.  From previous studies,  we know that the 
dynamics  of  the  distribution  of  consumption  that  are induced  by  different incentive 
compatible mechanisms or market allocations can be remarkably different. For instance, 
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Lucas (1978)  shows that the allocation  of resources that results from the use of money 
as the sole asset for intertemporal exchange yields an invariant distribution of consump- 
tion.  The current consumption of any given individual varies over time as that consumer 
spends more or less of his inventory of money each period to accommodate the fluctuations 
in  his  marginal  utility  of  current consumption,  but  these  fluctuations  in  individual 
consumption remain confined to a stable cross-sectional distribution of consumption.  On 
the other hand, the allocation of resources based on the use of shares of the endowment 
or pure credit arrangements, as studied, for example, in Taub (1990), typically result in 
an ever increasing disparity in the cross-sectional distribution of consumption. 
In this paper, we characterize efficient allocations in this informationally constrained 
environment  and  examine  the  dynamics  of  the  distribution of  consumption  that  are 
implied on normative as opposed to positive grounds. To solve our model, we reformulate 
our problem as a recursive problem and establish a Bellman equation which characterizes 
the efficient allocation of resources.  We then solve this Bellman equation for two classes 
of  current utility  functions.  We find in  our  examples  that the  efficient allocation  of 
consumption  induces spreading of the cross sectional distribution of consumption over 
time. 
Our approach in this paper builds on the partial equilibrium analyses of dynamic 
incentive  problems  carried out  by  Spear and  Srivastava (1987),  Green  (1987),  Taub 
(1990a), Phelan and Townsend (1991), Marimon and Marcet (1990), Abreu, Pearce, and 
Stacchetti  (1990),  Thomas  and  Worrall (1990),  and Atkeson  (1991).1  In these  earlier 
papers, a single principal is assumed to choose an incentive compatible allocation designed 
to minimize the discounted  value of resources needed to provide a single agent with a 
given level of expected  utility, where the value of resources is evaluated at some given 
set of prices.  In such a formulation, no period-by-period resource constraint is imposed 
upon  the  principal.  In  this  paper,  the  principal-or  planner-chooses  the  incentive 
compatible  allocation  for all agents subject to  a constraint that the total consumption 
handed  out  each  period  to  the  population  of  agents  cannot  exceed  some  constant 
endowment level.  Though many specific results from these other papers can be adapted 
to this new context, the basic Bellman equation that we study is quite different from those 
studied by earlier writers.  In the last section of the paper, we discuss the sense in which 
the one-on-one  principal-agent problem studied by Green and others can be viewed  as 
a component of a decentralized version of the efficient allocation that we construct. 
2.  A  MODEL 
In this section we set out the model informally, describe the allocation problem in more 
detail, and provide a plan for the rest of the paper.  We consider an economy in which 
there is a constant endowment  of a single, non-storable consumption good  available at 
each date.  There is a continuum of consumers, each with the preferences 
EE{t'=o  (I1-,8),8V(ct)0t} 
where ct is consumption of the good at date t and Ot  is an idiosyncratic, serially independent 
taste shock realized at date t with the distribution ,. 
1. These papers consider various forms of private information including unobserved effort, investment, 
income  shocks, and taste shocks.  The taste shock model is similar to the income shock model in that current 
income shocks cause consumers to have different marginal utilities of given transfers in the current period.  In 
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We  identify  each  consumer  with  a  number  w, which  we  interpret as  his  initial 
entitlement to expected, discounted utility.  We assume that all agents identified with the 
same w receive the same treatment.  Let qi denote a distribution of utilities w across the 
population  of  agents:  qi(A)  is  the  fraction  of  consumers  who  will  receive  expected 
discounted  utility equal  to  a number w in the  set A c  R.  We take the  distribution  qi 
implied by a given way of allocating resources as a complete description of the welfare 
consequences  of this allocation, thus treating individual consumers as anonymous. 
One way to think of a resource allocation in this setting is to think of a social planner 
as choosing a sequence of functions {c,j, where c,(w,  0t)  is the consumption agent w gets 
at date t if he reports the shock history (0o, 01, . . .,  a)  =  Ot  up to that date.  Since the 
shocks are assumed to be private, we will  also want to restrict attention to allocations 
that are incentive-compatible:  sequences  {c,j  that induce  each consumer to  reveal his 
shock history 0t  truthfully at each date. For any given initial distribution q/  of entitlements 
w, we say that the allocation described by the sequence {c,j attains if with resources y if 
(i) it is incentive-compatible,  (ii) it delivers expected utility w to all consumers initially 
entitled to  w, and (iii) the total consumption of all consumers does not exceed y in any 
period. 
The efficiency problem that we address in this paper is the following.  We define a 
function  (p* mapping distributions of utility  qi to the real line, where (p*(qi) is defined 
to  be  the  greatest lower  bound  on  constant  endowments  y  such  that there exists  an 
allocation that attains qi with resources y.  We call (p*(qi)  the minimum cost of attaining 
distribution qi. Our objective is to characterize the function  (p* and to find allocations 
that attain if with resources (p*(qi). This dual approach to the efficiency problem is similar 
to Green's. 
To begin to solve for efficient allocations, we reformulate our problem in the following 
recursive manner.  Instead of  having the planner choose  an agent's consumption  each 
period  as function  of  the  agent's initial entitlement and the entire history of  his taste 
shock reports, let the planner choose a function c0  that assigns initial consumption c0(w, 0) 
to any consumer with the initial entitlement w who gets the initial shock  0, and let the 
planner  choose  a  second  function  g0 that  specifies  this  consumers'  expected  utility 
entitlement w, from tomorrow on as a function of the same two variables: w1  = g0(w, 0). 
That is, on the basis of  his  w-value and his announced  shock, a consumer receives an 
immediate quantity of goods  and an expected  utility from next period on.  With goods 
so  allocated  and  consumers'  entitlements  so  respecified,  the  planner  is  faced  with  a 
problem of the same form next period, except that due to the reassignment of expected 
utilities, the initial utility distribution qi  has been replaced with a new one,  i1l. Accordingly, 
he chooses  a new pair of functions  (cl, gl),  and so on,  ad infinitum. 
We  call  such  a  sequence  of  functions,  suitably  restricted, an  allocation  rule (to 
distinguish it from an allocation).  We say that an allocation rule attains a utility distribu- 
tion  qi with resources y  if  (i)  it is incentive-compatible  in an appropriate (one-period) 
sense, (ii) if at each date t it delivers expected utility w to all consumers entitled to w at 
the beginning  of that period,  and (iii) the total consumption  of all consumers does not 
exceed y in any period. 
The advantage of this recursive reformulation of the problem of finding the efficient 
allocation of resources is that it delivers a Bellman equation that the cost function So*(41) 
must satisfy.  For several example utility functions (logarithmic utility, utility displaying 
constant relative risk aversion, and utility displaying constant absolute risk aversion) we 
are able to use this Bellman equation to show the existence of a solution to our original 
resource allocation  problem and characterize the solution in some detail. 430  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
In Section  3, we spell  out the details of the formulation of the resource allocation 
problem, and then establish that a utility distribution can be attained by an allocation 
with the constant endowment  y  if and only  if it can be attained by an allocation  rule 
with the same constant endowment y. This result will justify our focus on allocation rules 
in the rest of the paper.  In Section 4, we define the function  gp*  taking utility distributions 
into endowment levels and provide a Bellman equation for this function (p*. We describe 
an iterative process that, if it converges, produces a solution to this Bellman equation. 
In  Section  5,  we  apply  these  results to  particular parametric families  of  utility 
functions.  We show that with log utility, constant relative risk averse preferences, and 
constant absolute risk averse preferences, the solution  to the Bellman equation can be 
constructed from a static incentive problem and we develop some facts about the latter 
problem.  Section  6 then  characterizes the  solution  to  the  static problem for all three 
preference assumptions and develops the implications of this solution for the originally 
posed,  dynamic allocation problem. 
In Section 7, we consider the possibility of decentralizing efficient allocations through 
exchange  at competitively  determined prices.  We consider first the problem of finding 
prices  which  decentralize  our  planning  problem  of  finding the  least-cost  method  of 
attaining a given distribution of utility into component planning problems of minimizing 
the cost of  attaining each individual utility level  w within that distribution of utilities. 
An analogue to the first welfare theorem is proved.  Our results here are used to relate 
our work to Green's work and other earlier work in this area. 
We then ask whether the allocations  that solve these component  problems can be 
obtained through competitive trading in securities.  We find that if unmonitored trading 
in certain, one-period real bonds is admitted, efficient allocations cannot be so supported. 
Section 8 then concludes  the paper.  The proofs of various lemmas are contained in the 
Appendix. 
3.  PROBLEM  STATEMENT  AND  PRELIMINARIES 
In this  section  we  state our assumptions  on  preferences  and the  distribution of  taste 
shocks, provide definitions of allocations and allocation rules, and state two results that 
justify our subsequent focus on allocation rules. 
The taste shocks 0 take values in a finite set 0 = {01  ...,  On}, 01 >  >  0" > 0, with 
the fixed probability distribution ,u that assigns positive probability to all 0 values.  We 
adopt  the  normalization  E (0) =  1.  The current period  utility  function  V: R, --  D C R 
(where  D  is  an interval)  is  assumed to  be  continuous,  strictly increasing and strictly 
concave.  We denote the inverse function of  V by C: D -*  R+,  and refer to the value C(x) 
of this function  as the resources required by the utility level x  (even though the utility 
level is really (1 -/3)x0,  not x).2 
Each consumer is identified with a point  w E D  (which we interpret below  as the 
expected  discounted  utility this consumer obtains).  If two consumers have the same w 
we  allocate  the  same  discounted  expected  utility  to  each  of  them.  Let  9t?+  be  the 
(t + 1)-fold  product space  and let  at+  1  the product measure, be the distribution of the 
2.  Among the examples considered in Section 5, we include constant absolute risk aversion preferences 
of the form  V(c) = -exp  (-yc).  In this case, we allow  consumption  c to take on both positive and negative 
values, so the functions C(u)  and q*(/)  can take on values over the whole real line.  This example is instructive, 
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shock  history  O' in this  space.  Let O'  and  ,u'  be the  corresponding  infinite product 
space and probability measure. 
The individual knows his own history Ot at date t, but the planner's only sources of 
information  about this history are the reports provided by the  agent himself.  We use 
zt(Ot) to denote the report an agent plans (at date 0) to give about his date t shock if he 
has actually experienced  Ot,  and refer to z = {zt(0t)}2=o,  where for all t, zt:  tl  > 0,  as 
a reporting strategy. Let Z  be the set of all reporting strategies.  The truthful reporting 
strategy is denoted by z* = {z*(0t)},7=o  where z*(Ot) = Ot for all t and Ot  E  Ot+. 
Let ct(w, zt)  denote the consumption that individual w receives at date t on the basis 
of the reporting history zt,  and let (1 -,3)ut(w,  zt)Ot be the utility he receives from this 
consumption.  We will  find it convenient  to think of  a social  planner as assigning the 
sequence  u = {ut(w, zt)}2=o  to a consumer.  Let S be the set of such sequences-we  call 
them plans-such  that for all t _ 0 and all z't  E 0 t+l,  ut  zt)  is a Borel-measurable function 
on D, and such that: 
limtZO  ,83ES=0  f 3S ut+,(w, Ot+s)0t+S  =0  (3.1) 
for all w c D  and {I  Ot c 0'. 
Define the total expected utility function  U: D x S x Z -  D  by: 
U(w, u, z) = (1 -P)Et=? p{  ut[w, zt(0t)]0td1t+1. 
05t+l 
Thus  U(w, u, z) is the expected  discounted utility agent w receives if the social planner 
chooses  the plan u E S and the agent chooses  the reporting strategy z c Z. 
We define an allocation as a plan u c S that induces each agent to adopt the truthful 
reporting strategy z*  and that delivers expected  discounted  utility  w to  each agent  w. 
These requirements are, in turn: 
w=  U(w, u,9z*)  (3.2) 
for all w c D  and 
U(w, u, z*)_  U(w, u, z)  (3.3) 
for all wcD  and all zcZ. 
By a utility distribution we will mean any element qi of the set M  of all probability 
measures on  (D, D),  where D  are the Borel subsets of  D.  We say that an allocation  u 
attains qi with resources  y if: 
Q  cut(w.  tt)]d1,ut+'dqi-  y  (3.4) 
Dx@'+1 
for all t. Since ut is Borel measureable and C is continuous and non-negative, the integral 
on the left  in  (3.4)  is well-defined,  though  for some  allocations  u it can be  +00.  Our 
objective is to characterize the allocations that attain given utility distributions if E:  M. 
We next formulate a recursive description of resource allocation, which we refer to 
as an allocation rule (to distinguish it from the allocation we have just defined).  In this 
description, think of the planner as choosing a pair (f,t g,) of functions of (w, 0) at each 
date, where ft(w, 0) is interpreted as the current utility an agent receives if his expected 
utility entitlement from t on is  w and if he announces the shock  0, and gt(w,  0) is the 
expected utility entitlement this same consumer is assigned from tomorrow on.  That is, 
we think of the planner as summarizing a consumer's entire report history and his initial 
entitlement w0 in a single number w that represents his expected utility entitlement from 432  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
the  current period  on.  For each  t, (f,  gt): D x 0 -* Dx  D,  and we  require ft(*  0)  and 
gt(-  0 ) to be Borel-measurable.  Let  -  = {f,t gt}t=o  denote a sequence of such functions. 
A sequence  a  defines a plan  u as follows.  Let {wJ} solve  the difference equation 
wt+  =  gt(wt,  zt)  with  initial  value  wo, so that  wt:  D  x 0t  -  D,  and  define  u by  u,(wo,  zt)  = 
ft[wt(wo,  zt-),  zt].  We  say  this  plan  u is  generated  by a- =  {(ft, gt)}.  Clearly  the  plan  so 
defined has the requisite measurability properties.  We call the sequence  a  an allocation 
rule if the plan it generates satisfies the boundedness  condition  (3.1) (if it is in S); if the 
sequence  {wj} it implies satisfies the boundedness  condition  that for all wo  E  D  and all 
limt"0,8  twt(wo,  ot-1)  =  o;  (3.5) 
and if it satisfies two conditions that are analogous to the restrictions (3.2) and (3.3) that 
an allocation  must satisfy: 
For all t '0  and all w E D, 
w=  [(1 -/3)ft(w,  0)60  +f3g,(w, 0)]dy.  (3.6) 
For all t0,  all wcD  and all 0, 0E0, 
(  )  t ( W,  0 ) 0  +  13gt  ( W,  0 ) 
A 
(A  ,0)0+  g(W  (1 -/3(w,  6)+f3g~(  6) ?  1 -  t3(W,  6)60+f3g(w, 6).  (3.7) 
The requirement (3.7) is Green's (1987) temporary incentive compatibility. 
Given  an initial utility distribution  fr,  the functions  {gt}t=o  of an allocation  rule ar 
define a sequence {q,}  t=o  of distributions as follows.  For any Borel measurable g: D x 0  - 
D  and any Doc D, let: 
(Sg/i)(Do)=  d  (  do)  , 
B(DO) 
where Bg(Do) = {(w, 0) c D x 0:  g(w, 0) c Do}. This defines an operator Sg: M -> M. That 
is, if qf  is today's utility distribution and if utilities from tomorrow on are determined by 
g, then tomorrow's utility distribution is Sgq'. Given an initial utility distribution  i  E M, 
an  allocation  rule ar defines  a sequence  of  distributions  {Ji}Jt=O  in  M  by  i/o  = 4f and 
It+1  =  Sg,qft,  t 0> .  We will say that the allocation  rule a attains qi with resources  y if: 
IDxO  C[ft(w,  0)]d4td/,d'  y,  (3.8) 
DxO 
for all t _ O. 
In the rest of the paper we focus exclusively on allocation rules. The next two results, 
which state that there exists an allocation  u that attains qf  Ec  M  with resources y if and 
only if there exists an allocation  rule a  that attains ai with resources y, are presented to 
justify this focus. 
Lemma 3.1.  Let qi  E M and suppose the allocation u attains if with resources  y.  Then 
there is an allocation rule aJ that attains if with resources  y. 
Lemma 3.2.  Let if E M.  Suppose the allocation rule a attains  f' with resources  y and 
that u is the utility plan generated by a.  Then u is an allocation, and u attains if  with 
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The proofs of these two lemmas are given in the Appendix.  The proof of Lemma 
3.1 uses the fact that the set of utility plans satisfying the constraints (3.2) and (3.3) is 
convex, which in turn depends  on our assumption that the taste shocks affect consumer 
utility multiplicatively.  The proof of Lemma 3.2 involves proving that temporary incentive 
compatibility  (3.7)  implies  incentive  compatibility  in  the  sense  of  (3.3)  and  that the 
constraint (3.6) requiring that the allocation rule deliver to every consumer w the expected 
utility he is entitled to is equivalent to same corresponding constraint (3.3) for allocations. 
4.  A  BELLMAN  EQUATION  FOR  EFFICIENT  ALLOCATIONS 
For any utility distribution  fr  E M, define the value Sp*(fr)  to be the infimum of the set of 
endowment levels y that have the property that there exists an allocation  u that attains 
qf with  resources  y.  Roughly,  Sp*(fr) is  the  minimum  cost  (as  a  constant,  perpetual, 
endowment flow) of attaining  fr. If the distribution fr  cannot be attained with any finite 
resource  level,  we say that  Sc*(qf) = +0?.  Hence  (p*: M  -> R  u {+oo}.  We call an allocation 
efficient if it attains a distribution qi with resources  p*(f). 
Recall  from (3.8) that an allocation  rule o-  = {f,  g}%t=  attains a given distribution 
of  expected  utilities  fr  with resources y  only if the current resource cost is less than or 
equal to y in all periods t. We can restate this condition in a recursive fashion by saying 
that an allocation rule o-  attains a given distribution of expected utilities  fr  with resources 
y only if both the total consumption JDXO C[fo(w,  0)]dgdq,  allocated in time t = 0 is less 
than or equal to y and the allocation  rule o-' that is the continuation  of o- from period 
t = 1 on also attains, with resources y, the distribution of utilities 4f, = Sg0f that arises at 
the beginning  of period  of  t = 1 from the reassignment of entitlements  w according to 
go. Then, from the definition of the function S>*,  the minimum resources needed to attain 
a distibution  fr  contingent on  choices  of  functions fo  and  go assigning  utilities  in the 
current period and entitlements to utility in the future is given by 
max  If  C[fo(w, 0)]dxdq,,  (p*(Sgoq)  Dx(3 
Thus, the problem of finding the minimum resources required to attain the distribution 
+  E M is simply the problem of minimizing this quantity over choices of functions f  and 
g subject to constraints (3.6) and (3.7). 
This line of argument suggests that Sp*  should satisfy the functional equation: 
For all  f E M, 
Sf(ri) 
=  inffgeB  max  {f  C[f(w, 
0)]dtkd(r,  (P(Sg(f)}  (4.1) 
DxO 
where B is the set of functions f, g: D x 0 -> D x D such thatf  (-,  O)and g(-,  0) are Borel 
measurable and such that for all w E D, 
w =  f  (1 -P/)f  (w, 0)0 +f83g(w,  0)]dH;  (4.2) 
and, for all we D  and 0,z eE  0, 
(1 -p,)f(w,  0)0 +,lg(w,  0)?_ (1 -p,)f  (w, z)0 +,lg(w,  z).  (4.3) 
In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate that cp*  satisfies this Bellman equation 
(Lemma 4.1) and propose an iterative method for solving this equation (Lemma 4.2). 434  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
It is useful to define an operator T on the space of candidate resource cost functions. 
Let X be the set of all functions Sp:  M  R+ u {+oo},  and define the operator T: X -> X by: 
Problem T: 
(Ts)(qfr)=inffgeB  max{{  C[f(w,  O)]ddiJ,  (P(Sgqj)}.  (4.4) 
DxE3 
Then solutions to the Bellman equation (4.1) are fixed points of the operator T 
Lemma 4.1.  Sp*  is a fixed point of T 
Proof.  We show first that Sp*  -  Ts*,  then that Sp*  ?- Tp*. 
Suppose  that for some  + e M,  p*(4) > ( T<p*)(4f). Then there is  some  (f?,  go) e B 
and a 8 > 0 such that 
Sp*(4fi)  -  max  X  Cjf(w,  0)]djxdq,  (p*(Sgo)}>  8. 
DxOJ 
Let frl  = Sgoq,. Since  >*(qf)  > Sc*(qr), S>*(qf)  must be finite. Then by the definition of (p* 
and Lemma 3.2, there is an allocation rule al1  =  {f',  g1j}t=0  that attains ifl with resources 
* *(ij)  + (8/2).  Define  the  allocation  rule  oa =  j,?, g?},%0  by setting  (J0, g') = (fo, go) 
and  (Art+1,go+1)=(  fl,g,)  for  t-'0.  Then  0.0  attains  fr  with resources sp*(q)-(3/2),a 
contradiction.  This proves Sp*  ?  Tp*. 
Now  suppose that for some  fr  E M there is a 8 > 0 such that for all (f, g) E B 
max  {f  C[f(w, O)]dtd(P,  gp*(Sgi)} - (p*(q)> 8. 
Dxf3 
If S0*(qp)  = +??, this is impossible.  If Sp*(fr)  is finite, then by the definition of  q,* and 
Lemma 3.2 there is an allocation  rule oO = {f?, g?}lt0  that attains i/  with resources less 
than Sp*(fr)  + (8/2).  Let qfl  = Sgooq.  Construct an allocation rule a' = {f',  gl}t=o  by setting 
(ft,  gl) =(f't+l,  go 1) for all  t _ 0.  The rule al  attains qfr  with resources (p*(f) + (8/2). 
Thus S>*(p  r)?,*(,+)+(8/2),  from which it follows  that 
max  {J  C[Jo(w,  0)]dgdf,  Sp*(Sgoofr)} _*(J)  8 
a contradiction.  This proves  p*?- Ts*,  and completes the proof of the Lemma. 
The next result is our main tool for constructing g.*. 
Lemma 4.2.  Suppose there are functions  (p, (pc  and (p such that for  all  frEe  M,  (i) 
~Pc  -(  p  Pa  and  (ii) limOo T)  pa =  liMn,  =  T  p.  Then 'p  = 'p 
Proof.  The operator T is monotone,  so by (i), 
T  Sc =--  T f *T  =<  TP. 
for all n.  By Lemma 4.1,  Tn'p*= =P*.  Then the result follows  from (ii). 
In applying Lemma 4.2, economically natural candidates for the bounding functions 
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bound,  consider the autarkic allocation  that provides each consumer with the  constant 
consumption  level  that yields  him the expected  utility  w.  Recalling the normalization 
E(0)  = 1, this requires C(w)  units of goods  each period.  Then integrating with respect 
to a utility distribution qf  E M  gives the total resource cost: 
'Pa(f)  = T  c(w)dii.  (4.5) 
D 
Since an autarky allocation  is incentive compatible,  pa(fr)  p*(q)  for all  fr  E M. 
For the lower bound, consider utility plans that use a constant level of total resources 
and attain a given distribution  fr  by completely  insuring each agent w against idiosyncratic 
risk. Such an allocation will evidently be constant with respect to time: u,(w, 0') = u(w, 0,) 
for  some  fixed  function  u.  Call  this  function  uc(w, 0).  This  function  must solve  the 
problem: 
minu  C[u(w,  0)]dqfdg 
Dxf3 
subject to: 
f  Ou(w,  0)dg  = w  (4.6) 
for all w E D. 
The first-order conditions  for this convex problem are (4.6) and: 
C'[u(w,  0)] =A(w)0  (4.7) 
for all w E D, 0 Ez  0.  (That is, for each w, equate marginal utilities of consumption across 
all  shock  values.)  Solving  (4.6)  and  (4.7)  for  A(w)  and  uc(w, 0)  and  integrating with 
respect to ,  and  fr  gives: 
sQc(qf)  TD C[uc(w,  0)]ddqd4.  (4.8) 
DxE3 
(Note  that if the variance of 0 is zero, the functions  (pa,  and (Pc defined by (4.5) and (4.8) 
are the  same.)  Since  any  feasible,  incentive  compatible  allocation  is  feasible  for the 
problem solved by the allocation  uc(w, 0), Spc(J)  Sp>*(qJ)  for all  fr.  In the next section, 
we apply Lemma 4.2 to three examples with these choices of the bounding functions  qpc 
and  'pa. 
Of course,  our objective  is to  construct efficient allocation  rules-allocation  rules 
that attain the infimum in (4.1).  Finding a solution  'p* to (4.1) is only a means to that 
end.  We cannot show the existence of efficient allocation rules at the level of generality 
of this section.  We address and resolve the issue of existence of efficient allocation rules 
in the examples that we consider in Section 5. 
5.  SOME  EXAMPLES  SOLVED 
In this section, the results of Sections 3 and 4 and will be used to construct the efficient 
allocations in three cases in which current period utility takes either the logarithmic form 
V(c) = log (c), the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form V(c) = y-}c',  y < 1, y $ 0, 
or the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form V(c) = -exp  (-  yc), y > 0.  In all of 
these  cases,  we  use  Lemma 4.2 to  construct the efficient allocation  of  resources.  The 436  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
outline of our solution method is the same in all three cases: the procedure in each case 
differs only in the details.  The method is best explained in the case of logarithmic utility 
first, with proofs and the details of the other cases left to the appendix. 
In the  case  of  logarithmic utility, the  set  D  of  utility values  is  all of  R, and the 
inverse,  resource  requirement function  is  C(u)  = exp (u).  In this  case,  the  bounding 
functions  'ps, and Sp,  defined in (4.5) and (4.8) are given by: 
'P.a(tr)=  NO  exp (w)dqf.  (5.1)  D 
and: 
'Pjqi) = exp {-E[O  log (0)]}  exp (w)dqi.  (5.2)  D 
To apply Lemma 4.2, we will repeatedly apply the operator T defined in section 4 
by (4.4) to these two functions.  This application  is facilitated by noticing that both  'ps, 
and 'p, take the form of a constant a (say) times the moment JD C(w)dqi of the distribution 
fr. We will refer to these constants later, so define a,a =  1 and a, = exp {-E  [ 0 log (0)]}. 
It turns out in the logarithmic utility case that when  T is applied to a function  'p  of the 
form a JD C(w)dqi, the functions f  and g that minimize the right-hand side of (4.4) take 
the formf(w,  0)=r(0;  a)+w,g(w,  0)=h(0;  a)+w  and that T('p) takes the same form 
as 'p-a  constant  +$(a),  say, times the same moment JD  C(w)df.  In this case then, the 
problem of finding the fixed point of the operator T is reduced to the problem of finding 
the fixed point of the function  4: R+ -> R+ and the form of the functions  r and h.  This 
reduced  problem  is greatly simplified by the  fact that the  definition  of  +(a)  and the 
choices of r and h are independent  of both the individual entitlement w and the distribution 
of  entitlements  f.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  logarithmic  utility, the  problem  of  providing 
incentives  (choosing  r and h and finding a*  =  (a*))  is separable from the problem of 
delivering entitlements w to each consumer and can be solved as a relatively simple static 
incentive problem. 
To  be  more  specific,  we  show,  in  the  logarithmic utility  case,  that the  functions 
r(0; a),  h(0;a),  and +(a)  are defined by the following  problem. 
Problem P: 
(a)  =  minrh  max  exp (r(0))dg,  af  exp (h(0))d/i4, 
where r and h are functions  (n-vectors)  r, h: 0 -> R such that: 
I  (1 -  8) Or(O)  +j8h (0)  ]dSu  = O,  (5.3) 
and: 
(1 -p8)Or(O)  +?ph(0)-(1  -p8)Or(z)  +?ph(z),  all 0, zE  O.  (5.4) 
We develop the connection  between Problem P and the Bellman equation in a series of 
lemmas, the proofs of which are given in the Appendix, part 2. 
Lemma 5.1.  For any  a>0,  the minimum in Problem P  is  attained  by a  unique 
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The next result shows that Problem P has the desired relationship to Problem T. 
Lemma 5.2.  Let 4  be defined by Problem P and for  any a > 0  let the minimum be 
attained by r(O; a),  h(O; a).  Let  p(4fr)= a JD exp (w)dqi and let Tbe  the operator  defined 
by (4.4).  Then 
(TSp)(ifr)= q(a)J  exp(w)dq,  D 
and the right-hand side of  (4.4)  is attained by the pair (f, g) = (r(O; a) + w, h(0; a) + w). 
The essential aspects of the proof of this lemma are as follows.  First, it is clear that 
when functions f  and g take the form f(w,  0) =  r(0) + w, g(w, 0) =  h(0) + w, then f  and 
g satisfy the incentive constraints (4.2) and (4.3) if and only if r and h satisfy the incentive 
constraints  (5.3)  and  (5.4).  Next,  observe that when f  and g  take the form f(w,  0) = 
r(O; a)+  w, g(w, 0) = h(0;  a)+  w and Sp  takes the form a JD C(w)dqi, then the right-hand 
side of equation  (4.4) evaluated at the proposed form for f  and g can be written as 
max  exp (r(0))d,,  a{  exp (h(0))dl}({  C(w)dq) 
When this expression is evaluated at the solution to Problem P (r0(0; a),  h0(0; a)),  it is 
clearly equal to  +(a) JDC  (w)d11. To show that  T(qp)  = +(a)JDC  (w)dql when tp(4f)  = 
a JD  C(w)dqf, all that remains to be proved is that the functions f(w,  0) = r0(0; a) + w 
and go(w, 0) = h0(0; a) + w attain the infimum on the right-hand side of the operator T 
as defined in (4.4).  Details are given in the Appendix. 
Once it is established that T(qp)  = 4 (a)JD C(w)dqi when So  =  a  JD C(W)+q  the evalu- 
ation of limn ?, TOi, i = a, c is straightforward. We do this in Lemma 5.3. 
Lemma 5.3.  Thefunction o defined in Problem  Phas a uniquefixed point a* E[ac,  aa] 
and limn  .,p  n(ai)  = a*  for  i = c, a. 
Once we find the fixed point  a*  of the function  0  and the corresponding solution 
to Problem P (r0(0; a*),  h0(0; a*)),  we construct the efficient allocation rule a* = {f,  gI} 
byg(w,  0) = r0(0; a*) + w, g*(w,  0) = h0(0; a*) + w. As a final technical matter, we verify 
that oT*  satisfies the boundedness  condition (3.5).  This condition is verified in Section 6. 
This same approach can be used to solve  (4.4) with either CRRA or CARA utility. 
In the CRRA case, utility is given by V(c) = y-c'y,  y < 1, y $ 0, and the inverse, resource 
requirement function is given by C(u)  = (yu)1//.  The bounding functions take the form: 
N2aWf)J  (yw) llydq  D 
fpj()  =  LE(01/(1Y))Y(1Y)/YJ  (yw)'1Ydqi,  D 
so again they take the form  a JD  C(w)d/i.  As in the log case, we exploit the fact that, 
when  applying  T to  functions  of the form  a  times a moment of  NJ,  the functions that 
minimize  the  right-hand  side  of  the  operator  T  take  a  simple  form.  In  this  case, 
f?(w, 0) = r0(0; a)lwl,  and go(w, 0) =  h0(0; a)lwl,  where (r?, ho) solve a static Problem P, 
and T(qp)  is a function equal to +(a)  times the same moment JD  C(w)d/i.  The Problem 
P that defines the function 4 in this case is: 
Problem P: 
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subject to: 
[01-P/)0r(0) +/h(0)]dgu=_  l 
and: 
(1 -83)0r(O)+13h(O)'  (1 -83)0r(z)+/3h(z),  all 0, ze  0. 
In the CARA case, with utility given by  V(c) = -exp(-yc),  y > 0, D = (-oo,  0), and 
the inverse, resource requirement function by C(u)  =  -y-1  log(-u),  the bounding func- 
tions  qC',  and  pc defined in (4.5) and (4.8) are given by: 
(p.(NO) =  -1D  log(-w)dtf,  D 
Pc(if) =  y-'E[log  (0)]  -  ID  log  (-w)  dhf, 
so that these functions are now additive in a and the moment JD  C(w)d4f.  (It is a familiar 
fact that in order to exploit the conveniences  of this particular functional form one must 
let consumption  assume any real value-negative  as well as positive.) 
The resource-cost-minimizing choices of f and g take the form f(w,  0) =  -r(0;  a) w, 
g?(w, 0) =  -h(0;  a) w, and the static problem that defines the candidate function  0  in 
this case is: 
Problem P: 
?(a)  =  minr,h max  {-y  '|  log  [-r(0)]dg,  y-la  - y-'  log  [-h(0)]dL}, 
subject to: 
{  [(1 -/3)0r(0) + Plh(0)]d,u = -1, 
and: 
(1-p8)0r(O)+p8h(O)?>  (i-p8)0r(z)+p8h(z),  a110,zcE. 
In the Appendix, we adapt the statements and the proofs of Lemmas 5.1-5.3, stated above 
for the case of logarithmic utility, to cover CRRA and CARA cases. 
There are two features of all of these examples that make possible the factorization 
of the solution  to our Bellman equation into a resource cost associated  with providing 
incentives  (a*)  and  a resource cost  associated  with delivering the utility entitlements 
(JD  C(w)dqf).  The first feature of the problem that we use is the linearity of the incentive 
constraints (4.2)  and (4.3).  Because the incentive  constraints are linear in current and 
future utility, utility assignments f(w,  0), g(w, 0)  that are incentive  compatible for any 
given entitlement w can be scaled up or down in an additive or multiplicative fashion to 
be  made  incentive  compatible  for any other entitlement  w'.  The second,  and special, 
feature of the examples that we study is that the resource requirement function C satisfies 
a separability property that can be described as follows.  In each example that we study, 
there exists  a function  F: D -> R such that the resource cost ofproviding utility uw E D 
(or u + w E D)  can be factored into parts F(u)C(w)  (or F(u)+  C(w))  for any choice of 
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additive or multiplicative fashion, we also scale resource requirements up or down in an 
additive or multiplicative fashion.  By assuming that the taste shocks are i.i.d., we assume 
that  w and  0  are independent,  so  we  can  integrate over the  cost  of  the basic  utility 
assignment F(u)  and the cost of the scale factors C(w)  separately.  These conditions are 
also satisfied in the case of linear utility (so  C is linear), and in the case in which utility 
is given by  V(c) = log (c -5)  or  V(c) = y-'(c  -  8)I  with fixed y  (so  C(u)  = exp (u) +8 
or C(u)  = yu  "  +8),  so we suspect that the list of examples that we have supplied is not 
complete.  On the other hand, it is clear that there are utility functions  such that (4.4) 
cannot be solved by this method. 
6.  EFFICIENT  ALLOCATIONS  WITH  TWO SHOCK  VALUES 
In the previous  section  we  showed  that when  utility takes  suitable parametric forms, 
solutions to the Bellman equation defined by (4.1) can be constructed from solutions to 
the  static incentive  problem  we  called  Problem P.  In this  section,  we  verify that the 
efficient allocation rules we have constructed satisfy the boundedness condition (3.5) and 
develop some other properties of these rules. 
In the case of logarithmic utility, we demonstrated that the minimum on the right-hand 
side  of  the  Bellman  equation  (4.1)  is  attained  by  a  pair  of  functions  of  the  form 
f(w,  0)=r(0)+w  and g(w, 0)=h(0)+w  that assign current and future utility to agents 
entitled to  w and reporting 0.  These functions  are independent  of  the distribution of 
entitlements  to  expected  utilities  qi. From these  functions,  we  construct the  efficient 
allocation  rule  o- = {ft(w,  0),  gt(w,  0)}'t=,  where  f, =f  and  gt  =  g  for  all  t _ 0. Using  this 
form for g,  the solution of the difference equation describing the evolution of individual 
entitlements to utility is 
wt(wo,  0t1)  =  w0+t-10 h(0j). 
The utility allocated to the individual consumer under the efficient allocation is thus given 
by 
ut(wo,  Ot) =ft(wt(wo,  Ot-1),  ot)  =  w0+YL'0  h(0S)+ r(0t),  (6.1) 
and consumption  allocated to that individual is given by 
ct(wo,  Ot)  =  C[ut(wo,  Ot)]  exp  (w0)Hl`  exp  (h(0j))  exp  (r(0t)).  (6.2) 
It is clear from these expressions that the allocation obtained in this way from the solution 
to Problem P in the logarithmic utility case satisfies the boundedness condition (3.5).  We 
will prove that (3.5) is satisfied in the cases of CRRA and CARA utility in Lemma 6.1 
later in this section after we impose the assumption that there are only two possible values 
of the taste shock  0. 
Equation (6.1) implies that the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of utility 
(the logarithm of consumption)  is given by 
Var (ut(wo,  0t)) = Var (w)  + (t -  1) var (h(0))  +Var (r(0)). 
Hence, the degree of inequality in the cross sectional  distribution of wealth-measured 
in utils-grows  without bound  when resources are efficiently allocated.  This finding is 
striking but certainly not unexpected in view of the results of Green (1987), Taub (1990a), 
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The equivalent expression for the efficient evolution of individual utility (6.1) in the 
cases of CRRA and CARA utility is given by 
ut(wo,  01) = IwoVl`  h(0J  I r(0t). 
In these cases, it is the variance of the distribution of the logarithm of utility that grows 
without bound. 
One consequence of the fact that agents have concave utility functions and that their 
expected  utility  wt (or the  log  of  w,) follows  a random walk is that each consumer's 
expected utility level converges to the minimum level in D  with probability one.  In the 
logarithmic utility case, this can be seen from the definition of the fixed point a* =  (a*). 
For a* to be a fixed point of 0, it must be the case that J0  C[h(0;  a *)]dp. = 1, and since 
C(x)  = exp (x)  is convex,  le  h(0; a*)d,  <0,  so that {wt} drifts toward -oo.  The same 
conclusion  holds  for the  other examples.  Thomas  and Worrall (1990),  Proposition  3, 
prove this result more generally in a closely related context. 
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the solutions to Problem P for the 
case  of  two  shock  values,  01>  02>0,  with  probabilities  Al  and  92.  We  verify  the 
boundedness  condition  (3.5)  for CRRA and CARA utility only  in this case.  We also 
explore the nature of the solution to Problem P in the case of logarithmic utility.  Since 
the notation for Problem P differs slightly between the CRRA and the CARA cases (a 
enters multiplicatively in the former and additively in the latter) we deal here with the 
CRRA case, treating the essentially identical CARA case in side remarks. 
We begin by reformulating Problem P (in the logarithmic utility case) as a problem 
of choosing (r, h) to minimize J0  exp {r( 0)}dli,  subject to incentive constraints (5.3), (5.4), 
and the constraint that 
3  exp (r(0))d,jt  -  aj  exp (h(0))dg. 
This  reformulation is justified  by the  fact that the  minimizing choices  of  r and  h  in 
Problem P equate lo exp {r(0)}dp.  and a J<  exp {h(0)}dpu. This fact can be proved for 
all the example utility functions  we consider using the line of proof for Lemma A.3 in 
the appendix.  Thus Problem P, as specialized to the two shock case, can be restated: 
Problem P: 
+(a)  = minrh  Ei=1,2  /LiC(ri) 
subject to: 
Ei=l,  2 gi[C(ri)  -  aC(hi)]  = 0,  (6.3) 
Ei=1,2  4i[(I  -p  )  Oiri+  +hi]  = K,  (6.4) 
(1-,l/)01ri  +,8h1 '  (1 -,  )0lr2+ph2,  (6.5) 
(1 -,3)  02  r2  +,8h2'::-  (1 -,8)  02 r,  +8hl  1  (6.6) 
where  ri = r(0i)  and  hi =  h(0i),  i =  1, 2, and where the function  C  and the  constant  K 
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We associate the multipliers A 5, 8 and v with the constraints (6.3)-(6.6)  respectively, 
requiring the latter two to be non-negative.  The first-order conditions  are then: 
(1  -A)pl1C'(r1)  =  ~(l-p)p10O  +8(l  -p)01-  V(1 -/3)02,  (6.7) 
(1 -1k)2C'(r2)  =  _(1-)A202-'6(1  -,)01+  VO  1-8)02,  (6.8) 
AapA1  C'(h1) = 5/3A1  + 863- vfl,  (6.9) 
AaA2C'(h2)  =  032  -  683 +  v,  (6.10) 
together with the complementary slackness conditions.  (For the CARA case, conditions 
(6.7)-(6.10)  hold with a = 1.) 
In  all  cases,  we  have  extablished  that  Problem  P  is  solved  by  unique  values 
(r1, r2, h1, h2), given a, and that a = + (a)  has a unique solution.  We can construct this 
solution by calculating the unique solution (r1, r2, h1, h2, A,  4, 8, v, a) to the nine equations 
given  by  (6.4),  (6.7)-(6.10),  the  complementary  slackness  conditions  associated  with 
(6.5)-(6.6),  and the equation  a = +(a).  Numerically, this is an inexpensive  enterprise, 
and indeed  would be so with many more than two shock values.  Here, we summarize 
the main qualitative features of the solution in a lemma. 
Lemma 6.1.  Let  (r1, r2, h1, h2) solve  Problem P.  Then r > r2  and  h, < h2.  The 
constraint (6.6)  is binding, and  (6.5)  is slack.  In the CRRA case with y $ 0, 
_p1<  hi <  h2 <,8-1 
In the CARA case, 
-f3l<hi. 
Remark.  In the CRRA and CARA utility cases, the boundedness  condition  (3.5) 
is an immediate consequence  of the bounds on hi given above. 
Proof  The  two  incentive  constraints  together  imply  (01 -  02)(r1  -  r2)  '  0,  with 
equality  if and only if both  are binding.  Since  01  >  02,  this implies  r, '  r2 and hence 
h, _  h2, with equality if and only if both constraints bind. 
Suppose, contrary  to the lemma, that both incentive constraints bind, so the multipliers 
8  and v are both positive,  r, = r2, and h, = h2. Then (6.9),  (6.10) and the fact that C' is 
strictly increasing imply that v = 8 > 0.  Then (6.7),  (6.8) and the fact that 01 >  02 imply 
that  C'(rl)>  C'(r2)  contradicting  the  fact  that  r, =  r2.  Hence  at  most  one  of  these 
multipliers is positive, which proves that r, > r2 and h, <  h2- 
Now if h1  <  h2, (6.9) and (6.10) imply that (8 -  v) < 0.  Since only one can be positive, 
we conclude  that 8 = 0  and v > 0.  Thus 
(1 -1,3)02r2+j3h2  = (18-3)02r,  +13h,  (6.11) 
must also hold at the optimum. 
To verify the bounds  on the  hi in the  CRRA  case,  note  that (6.11)  and the total 
utility constraint together imply: 
(1 -  8)  r, +j8Xhl  =-.  (6.12) 
When y>  0, the lower bound obviously holds.  Then (6.11) and (6.12) imply: 
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where the  strict inequality  is  implied  by  r1> r2  0.  When  y <0,  the  upper bound  is 
obvious and (6.12) implies 
ph1 = -1  -  (1 -f3)rl  >  -1, 
where the inequality is implied by the fact that r, < 0. 
In the CARA case, (6.12) is replaced by: 
(1-p8)rr +,8h  =-1.  (6.13) 
Since the minimum in Problem P cannot be attained with r, = 0, the condition p8h1  > -1 
clearly holds.  || 
The conclusion  in  Lemma 6.1 that the  only  incentive  constraints that bind  at the 
optimum are those  comparing an agent's utility when he reports his true shock to the 
utility he would  get if he reported the next higher value can be proved for the general 
case of  N  shock values.  See Thomas and Worrall (1990), Lemma 4. 
In all  of  the  cases  considered,  then,  efficient allocation  rules, and hence  efficient 
allocations,  can be  constructed using the  Bellman equation defined in Section 4.  The 
solutions  all have the property that the consumer with the low  0 value-a  low urgency 
to consume-is  just indifferent between revealing his true situation and pretending he is 
more eager to consume than he really is.  That is to say, if the efficient allocation were 
to provide any more insurance against a high taste shock, people with low shocks would 
submit false  claims.  Put yet a third way, following  Green, a constraint must be placed 
on consumers' ability to borrow to finance high current consumption. 
7.  DECENTRALIZING  EFFICIENT  ALLOCATIONS 
To what extent is it possible to use competitive exchange to achieve the efficient allocations 
we have calculated in the examples of Section 5, or the allocations more generally defined 
in Sections 3 and 4?  In this section, we show how prices can be used to decentralize the 
overall  planning  problem  into  component  planning  problems.  This  decentralization 
provides  a connection  between  the efficiency problem addressed in this paper and the 
principal-agent problem studied by Green and others.  Then we discuss the possibilities 
for decentralizing the efficient allocation using unmonitored trading of securities among 
individual consumers. 
To define what we mean by the "component planning problem," consider a planner 
responsible  for allocating resources only to those who are initially entitled to expected 
utility  w0.  He  assigns  an  allocation  of  utility  (specific  to  w0) u(wo)  = {u(wo,  0')}=O, 
Ut  t+  --> D.  He does  so in such a way as to minimize the value of the total resources 
he  allocates,  with resources at each date valued  at prices determined by the sequence 
q =  {qt}'t=O,  qt e (0,  1).  The  objective  for  this  planner  is: 
v(wo)  =  min1u,(W,.)1  (1 -  qo)f  C[u0(w0,  0)]dA 
+t=l  (1 -  qt)f.2-  qS|L  C[u,(wO,  0t)]d/L'+  (7.1) 
05t+l 
subject to the incentive constraints (3.2) and (3.3).  It is as if consumers are grouped by 
their initial w0  values, with each group represented by its own social planner or principal, 
and then these planners trade in claims to current and future resources among themselves 
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The next result provides one connection between these component planning problems 
(7.1) and the problem of finding efficient allocations. 
Theorem 1.  Suppose there exists an allocation u =  {u,(wo, Ot)}t=O,  prices q =  q, 
a  distribution  of utility  qi0,  and  resources y such  that 
(i)  at prices q, for all woe D,  u(wo) solves (7.1) subject to (3.2) and  (3.3); 
(ii)  for  all  t, JDxOt+1  Ciut(wo,  Ot)]dAt+1dfio=y. 
(iii)  jt=1(1 -  qt)flt-o  q, <+00. 
Then  the allocation  u attains  qi0 with resources y  and y = sp*(qo). 
Proof.  That u attains  /io with resources y is immediate.  We prove that u is efficient 
by contradiction.  Suppose  that y >  *(pfIo).  Then there exists  some  other allocation  ui 
which attains  /io with resources y < y.  Thus, by (ii), 
|  C[t(woq  Ot)]dl-tt+1ddRo  <  C[ut(woq  0t)]d1it+1dqio 
Dxo  f+1  DXO'+l 
for all t, with the difference between these two quantities being at least y -9.  Then, 
(1  qo) TDX  w  C[ io(wo,  O)]dlf'o+  E=i  (1 -  qt)Hlt-  qsf  C[ it(wo,0  t)]dl''  dqfo < 
DxO  0fn+1 
(-qo)f  C[juo(wo  0)]dadqio  +  t  =1 (1-  qt)f  t-'  qsf  C[ut(wo,  0t)]d1att+1dqfo< +co 
DxEl  05t+1 
with the last inequality following from (iii).  This contradicts the fact (i) that u(w0) solves 
(7.1) for each w0.  11 
Theorem 1 is an analogue to the first theorem of welfare economics, with conditions 
(i)-(iii)  defining the  counterpart to  a competitive  equilibrium.  Condition  (i)  requires 
quantities to be optimal (cost-minimizing) for each w, given prices; condition (ii) is market 
clearing; and condition  (iii) is a boundedness  condition on prices. 
Theorem 1 is helpful in relating our approach to that taken by Green, (1987), Taub 
(1990b),  Phelan and Townsend  (1991),  and others who have formulated the allocation 
problem  as  one  involving  a  single,  risk-neutral principal  dealing  one-on-one  with  a 
continuum of agents.  In these formulations, the principal is given an objective function 
that corresponds to (7.1), but with a constant price qt  =  q for all t that is simply assigned 
to him.  These authors then show that (7.1) (with constant prices) can be solved with a 
Bellman equation of the form 
v(w)  =  minr,h  f  {(l  -  q)C(r(O))  + qv(h(0))}dA 
subject to: 
w  X  [(1 -O)r(0)0+8h(0)]d1; 
and 
(1 -  /3)r(0)0+f3h(0)  _  (1 -  /)r(z)O+  /h(z), 
for all 0, z e  0.  Green, and Townsend and Phelan assign q = ,f to the principal.  For some 
preferences (for example,  logarithmic) this will clear markets in the sense of condition 
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it will not.  Taub leaves  q free, but constant, and then varies it to satisfy (ii).  He uses 
linear utility, an instance of CRRA preferences, so the price associated with efficiency is 
in fact constant and this procedure works.  This procedure of varying the constant price 
to clear markets would also work in Green's framework (since his income shock model 
with  CARA  utility maps  exactly  into  the  model  with multiplicative  taste  shocks).  In 
general, though, this procedure will not work because it fails to recognize the potential 
dependence  of q on the distribution 'fo. 
In the examples that we have studied in Section 5 and 6, the prices that decentralize 
the efficient allocation  can be found from the solution to Problem P.  In particular, we 
show that this problem is equivalent to the problem of minimizing current resource use 
(Jo  exp (r(O))dA in the  case  of  logarithmic utility)  subject to the incentive  constraints 
(5.3),  (5.4) and the resource constraint 
f  exp (r(O))dg  '? a4 exp (h(0))dg. 
It is straightforward to show that the Lagrange multiplier A on this constraint serves to 
define  prices  q = {q}to,  qt =A  for  all  t, that  decentralize  the  efficient  allocation  into 
component planning problems in the sense of (7.1). 
The foregoing discussion involved the possibilities  for decentralizing the economy's 
overall  planning  problem  into  component  planning  problems,  one  for  each  level  of 
expected utility entitlements.  It leaves open the question of whether decentralization can 
proceed further, with efficient allocations exhibited as some kind of market equilibrium 
with a particular set of securities or intermediation arrangements. We address this issue 
next. 
One sense in which it must be possible to decentralize further is the following.  Let 
titles to current and future endowment streams be allocated across agents, and imagine 
that every agent deposits all of his claims with a zero-profit intermediary that thereafter 
acts exactly as the central planner of earlier sections.  Since there are many households, 
we can imagine that there are many such intermediaries, so this arrangement could be 
viewed  as  competitive.  The  difficulty with  using  such  an  equilibrium  as  a model  of 
observed market arrangements stems from the capability to  monitor individual wealth 
positions  granted to  this  intermediary, relative  to  the  capabilities  of  actual  financial 
institutions.  The question  we ask next, then,  is whether the efficient allocation  can be 
supported by private intermediation if households are permitted to engage in unmonitored 
trading of ordinary securities. 
The specific security we introduce is a one-period real bond, entitling the holder to 
one unit of goods tomorrow.  Let the equilibrium price, today, of such a bond be Q(if). 
We consider the situation of an individual household that is entitled to w units of expected 
utility under its arrangement with the intermediary (planner), that has realized the shock 
0, and that holds  a real bond  when the  economy  is in the state  qi. Now  if  (f, g)  are 
efficient and if this allocation  is consistent  with unmonitored bond trading, it must be 
the  case  that at the  market clearing price  Q(qi)  every household  chooses  to  report  0 
truthfully, and that no  household  chooses  to use the bond  market to trade away from 
the efficient allocation.  If so, then the familiar condition: 
Q(4f)  V'[C(f(  w, 0, OM))]  0 = ,BJ  V'[C(f(g(w,  0,  f),  0', Sgo))] 0'd,ti'  (7.4) 
must hold for all (if, w, 0).  That is to say, all households'  marginal rates of substitution 
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In the last section we presented first-order conditions  (6.7)-(6.10)  that characterize 
the functions f and g, so to see if (7.4) holds we can just solve these equations and inspect 
the result. We do this for the logarithmic case only.  In this case, neitherf  nor g depends 
on the distribution if. Consumption is given by c(w, 0) = C[f(w,  0)].  The marginal utility 
function is: 
V'[c(w, 0)] = 
exp (w) exp (r(0))' 
The expected marginal utility of tomorrow's consumption is: 
E{V'[c(g(w,  0), 0']}=  exp (w) exp (h(0))  {exp  (r(0'))} 
Hence for (7.4) to hold, it must be the case that 
01 exp (h(0,))  02 exp (h(02))  (7.5) 
exp (r(01))  exp (r(02)) 
To check (7.5) in this logarithmic case, we solve the first-order  conditions (6.7)-(6.10). 
When C(x)  = exp (x), the multipliers A and 5 on the constraints (6.3) and (6.4) are equal 
to ,  and a  respectively, and (6.7)-(6.10)  can be simplified to: 
r, =log  (a)+log  (0,)+log  [1 +(  )  aj  (7.6) 
r2 =log  (a)  +log(02)  +[109 
1  +  1(7.) 
h, = log [1  (ui ) aj]  (7.8) 
h2  =  lg[10  +  (7)9a 
From these equations (7.6)-(7.9),  we see that (7.5) can hold only if the multiplier ( equals 
zero, which is to say, only at the full-information allocation. 
Allen (1985) addresses the related question of whether any insurance is possible if, 
ex ante, consumers can trade sure claims to future consumption before their unobserved 
idiosyncratic shocks are realized.  He argues that, in this instance, no insurance is possible 
since the  incomplete  information  insurance problem here reduces to  a static incentive 
problem in which consumers, independently of their taste shock realizations, all choose 
the  shock  reporting strategy that maximizes  the  discounted  present value  of  transfers 
received and then trade consumption claims to achieve the desired time path for consump- 
tion, much as they would in a pure credit decentralization of this economy. 
8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Within a specific dynamic setting with private information we have defined efficiency in 
a way that respects the information structure, proved that if efficiency can be achieved 
it can be achieved through a recursive allocation rule, developed  a Bellman equation for 
efficient allocation  rules, and used this Bellman equation to construct such rules under 
specific parametric assumptions  on preferences.  In all of the cases we  study, efficient 
allocations have the features found by Green (1987) for the CARA case, by Taub (1990b) 446  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
for the case of linear utility, and by Phelan and Townsend  (1991) in numerical results: 
consumer  wealth  positions  follow  random  walks,  with  inequality  growing  over time 
without bound.  As found by Thomas and Worrall (1990), ever-increasing dispersion of 
utility combined  with concave  utility implies that average utility continually decreases. 
The  efficient  allocation  delivers  an  ever-increasing  fraction  of  resources  to  an  ever- 
diminishing fraction of society's population. 
Our applications  to  specific cases rest very much on the nature of the parametric 
preference families studied.  Roughly speaking, we restrict attention to preferences that 
have the property that a specific moment of the utility distribution suffices to determine 
resource allocation.  In these cases, if we know how best to allocate risk among consumers 
at any one wealth level, we can scale this allocation to suit any wealth level, and hence 
any wealth distribution.  Thus we obtain a theory of distribution applicable to situations 
where distribution does not matter allocatively.  But the Bellman equation we propose is 
much more general (though  our derivation rests on the multiplicative character of the 
privately observed  shocks).  It will  be  interesting to  see  whether it can be  applied  to 
situations in which changes in the wealth distribution feed back on the nature of risk- 
pooling  opportunities. 
When equilibrium in our setting is calculated under some incomplete market struc- 
tures-such  as the cash-in-advance monetary system used in Lucas (1978)-in  invariant 
distribution  of  wealth  is  found,  as  contrasted to  the  growing  inequality  found  here. 
Similarly, Taub (1990) finds an invariant distribution when a lower bound is imposed on 
utility.  These  results are not to be interpreted as an advantage of monetary or credit- 
constrained equilibria, but rather as evidence of their inefficiency. The growing inequality 
we find is not a pathology,  but a normative prescription of the model. 
If we think of the infinite-lived agents in this economy  as a dynastic family with 
successive generations, however, the prescription of growing inequality highlights a feature 
of  our notion  of  efficiency that surely merits further examination.  In our formulation, 
the welfare of any member of future generation is the sole responsibility of his currently 
living  progenitor,  and  the  latter is  granted an  unlimited  right to  borrow against the 
entitlements of his heirs to satisfy his current  consumption needs.  If one were to re-examine 
the  efficiency question  in  an overlapping generations framework with some  minimum 
placed  on  the  welfare  of  future generations,  then  it seems  likely that efficient wealth 
distributions  would  converge  to  some  distribution  with  finite  dispersion,  rather than 
exhibit the ever-growing dispersion implied by our notion of efficiency.  In such a setting, 
the  prescription  of  growing  inequality  for society  as a whole  would  transpose into  a 
prescription of growing inequality within each cohort, and the variance of the function 
h(O), shown in Section 8 to govern the rate of inequality growth in our model, would be 
a main determinant of the (finite) variance of wealth across all individuals. 
APPENDIX 
Part I:  Proofs of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 
In order to establish the two lemmas, we need to relate incentive compatibility in the sense of (3.3) to temporary 
incentive compatibility as defined in (3.7).  This requires some additional notation. 
Under a given plan u, a consumer has the opportunity to re-think his reporting strategy at any date r _  1, 
after  he has already  submitted  reports  Z^r =  (ZO  .  .  .  ,  Zr-i)  in the preceding  r periods. To consider  his incentives 
for reporting truthfully, we need  a notation for describing his options  at any date  r.  Let z = {z,( 'O)}=  cz Z 
denote his reporting strategy from date r onwards.  Then the utility he will be assigned by the plan u at date 
r + t will be 
Ur+t[WO,  (ZO.  *  Zr-  i,  Z00(1),  ZI(Or,  O0+1).  Zt(Or.  *  Or+,))] ATKESON  &  LUCAS  ON  EFFICIENT  DISTRIBUTION  447 
where the first r co-ordinates of his reports through period r + t are arbitrary numbers in E and the last t+ 1 
are functions  of the shocks he actually receives from period r through period r +  t.  We use (9,, z) to refer to 
an r-vector of given past reports followed  by the reporting strategy z, and write the agent's utility assignment 
at r+ t as  Ur+[w0,  (9,, zt(Ot))],  where z  =  (z0,  . .,  z,).  Define the expected,  discounted  utility from period r 
on by: 
UrW  Zr  Z)==( 3  o 
u+[wo,  (Z'r  z  (e  ))]0,dg`.  UJ[W0, u, (, , z)]  =  1P)l,=  Ur+t[0  9,z(~)Od.t1 
These functions  Ur:  D  x Sx  r  x Z -  D  satisfy: 
UJ[wo,  U, (9r, z)]  =  {(1  P)Ur[WO,  (9r, Z0(O))]0+/3Ur+1[Wo,  U, (9r, zOO),  z'(0))]}d/t,  (A.1) 
for r-0,  where z'(0)  denotes the continuation  {z,(0t)},=1  of the reporting plan z = {z,(0')},=,  with the first 
coordinate of each history O'  equal to 0.  We now provide a preliminary result that will help in linking the two 
incentive compatibility requirements (3.3) and (3.7). 
Lemma A.1.  A plan u satisfies the constraint (3.3) [for all w c D and all z E Z,  U(w, u, z*) ?  U(w, u, z)] 
if and only if it satisfies: 
(1-3)ur[w  [W, (,,Z  r)]00+3Ur+,[W,  u (Zr 0  z*)]  (1 -3)ur[W,  (Zr 0)]0+3Ur+[W,  u, (Zr 0, z)]  (A.2) 
for all w c D,  all r_  O, all 9z  0E  rall reporting  strategies z, and all 0, 0 c 0. 
Condition  (A.2) requires that for all past reports 9^  and for all reporting strategies that might be adopted from 
next period on, the agent is induced to report his shock  0 truthfully in the current period. 
Proof.  Condition  (3.3) is a special case of (A.2), so the sufficiency of (A.2) is immediate. 
The proof  of necessity is by contradiction.  Assume that (3.3) holds but that for some date r _ 1, some 
w c D,  and some  sequence  of  taste shock  reports 9,, the inequality  (A.2)  fails to  hold.  Use  z  to  denote  the 
taste-shock reporting strategy from date r onwards that dominates truth telling z* in these circumstances. Then 
for some  0, 
(I  3)Ur1W,  Uzr  0)10+P3Vr+J[W  U,  Uzr  0,  Z)] 
<  (If) )ur[W,  )r]  OU(0)10+[wUr+(W,  U,  zr  * o(0)  ]  l] 
where z' is the continuation of the strategy z after 0 has been realized.  We will use z to construct a reporting 
strategy z which begins at date 0 and satisfies  U(w, u, z) >  U(w, u, z*), thus contradicting (3.3). 
Define the reporting strategy z as follows:  (1)  for t < r, let f,(0')  =  z*(0,)  = 0, for all  O'c Ot?I;  (2)  for 
t_  r, continue with truth-telling unless the shock history (9,, 0)  has been realized; (3) if the history (9,, 0)  has 
occurred, adopt the reporting strategy z from date r onwards.  The strategy z yields the same utilities as does 
z*  in the first r -1  periods, and the same utilities from t on provided  Or?  Z(9r, 0)  If Or  =U(9r, 0),  z yields 
a  strictly higher expected  utility  from date  r on,  conditional  on  this  event.  Since  all  shocks  have positive 
probability, this  event  occurs with positive  probability.  Thus  U(w, u, z)>  U(w, u, z*),  which  is the  desired 
contradiction.  11 
Under a given allocation  u, two agents may arrive at date t with different initial entitlements w0 and wi' 
and  different shock  histories  O`-I  and  ot-1  yet be  entitled to the same  expected  utility from date  t on,  as 
defined by the function  U,. In general, these two agents need not receive the same current utility u,  even if 
they  receive the same shock  0,.  Obviously,  such an allocation  u cannot be reproduced for all agents by an 
allocation  rule.  It would  be  useful,  therefore, to be  able to  restrict attention to  allocations  u that have the 
following  identical treatment property: 
for all t_  0,all  wo,wieED,  and all  01  0-tc  0t' 
U,[wO, u,  (0t1,  Z*)] =  U-[i,  u,  (Ot,  Z*)]  (A.3) 
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and 
Ut+|[wo,  u, (914  0,  z*)] = U,+?[  w,,  u, (6w', 6, Z*)] 
for all 6 E 0.  The next result justifies restricting attention to allocations with this property. 
Lemma A.2.  Let /,  e M and suppose the allocation u attains if with resources  y.  Then there is an allocation 
u' that satisfies (A.3)  and also attains 4i with resources  y. 
Proof  Let if  e M be given and suppose that u attains 4i with resources y.  If u does not satisfy (A.3), let 
t be the first date at which it fails to do so.  Define the sets H,(w),  w E D, by: 
H,(w)  = {(wo, 06'')  c D x 0':  U,[wo,  u, (0'',  z*)]  =  w), 
so  that  H,  defines  a  partition  of  D x 0'.  Let  P'  denote  the  conditional  distribution  of  (wo, 6'-')  given 
(wo, 6t-')  HI,(w).  For all  A  O')EH,  (w),  all s  0  O, and all sequences of reports z'  for periods t through 
t+s,  define u?+, as the average: 
Ut+s  WO  , 
(0t_I,  ZS))]  U,+s[wo,  (0t-',  zs))]dPW . 
Define the coordinates of the utility plan u' as equal to those of u for dates t-  1 and earlier, and equal to u,+s 
for s0> O. Then u' satisfies (3.2) and (3.3), so u' is an allocation.  Since the function C is convex, the allocation 
u' also satisfies (3.4).  Clearly the allocation  u' satisfies (A.3) for all s -  t. Continuing the construction through 
all dates t completes the proof of the Lemma.  11 
We remark that this proof uses the convexity of the set of plans satisfying (3.2) and (3.3) to ensure that 
the constructed plan  u' is an allocation.  This is the only point in the argument of Section 3 at which we use 
the assumption that the taste shocks 6 enter multiplicatively.  If the incentive constraints did not define a convex 
set, one would need to define allocations and allocation rules as measures, as do Phelan and Townsend (1991). 
We have not yet pursued this line of generalization. 
We now proceed with the proof of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1.  Let  ii  c M  be given and suppose  that u attains  4i with resources y.  In view  of 
Lemma A.2, we may take u to have the property (A.3).  If a set H,(w)  is empty, let f(w,  6) =  g,(w, 0) = w.  If 
not, for U,[wo, u, (06-',  z*)] =  w, define (f,  g,) by: 
f(w,  6) = u,[wo, (6t-',  0)] 
g,(w, 0) = U,?,[wo,  u, (6t-',  0, Z*)]. 
That these functions satisfy (3.6) and (3.7) follows  from (3.3) and (3.4), applying Lemma A.1 and (A.2).  The 
boundedness  property (3.5) follows  from (3.1).  Hence  or  = {(f,,  g,)}  is an allocation  rule. 
It remains to verify that (3.8)  holds  for all  t.  Let {/,}  be the sequence  of  distributions on  D  defined 
recursively from i10  by ifi,+  =  Sg,tt,  with the functions g, defined as above.  We next use an induction to show 
that for any integrable function  F: D -  R, 
I  F(w)d4f,,  =1  F[U,(wo, u, (6'-',  z*))]diod,is'.  (A.4) 
For t = 0, (A.4)  follows  from (3.2).  Suppose  (A.4) holds for t. Then 
|  F(w)dtf,+,  f  F[g,(w,  0)]d4idi, 
=  ID|e' {J|  F[g,(U,(wo,  u, (t-l',  z*)),  0)]d}dodA' 
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where the first equality is implied by the definition of the sequence {I/i},  the second by the induction hypothesis, 
and the third by the definition of the function g,. This proves (A.4). 
To verify (3.8), then, we apply (A.4) to the function F(w)  = Jo C[f,(w,  0)]dli  and use the definition offt: 
J  C[ft(w,  O)]dgdqi,  = |  C[f(  Ut(wo, u, (O"i,  z*)),  0t)]dqI0dg,+I 
DXi3  DX(31+1 
=  |  C[tu(wo,  (O-I,  Ot))]dq/0dgt+1 
This proves Lemma 3.1.  || 
Proof of Lemma 3.2.  Suppose the allocation rule af = {ft, gt} attains qi with resources y. Let u be generated 
by a, so that u c S.  We need to show that u satisfies (3.2)-(3.4). 
To verify (3.2), we will show that: 
for all t  ?_O, wo  E D, and  0t-I  E 0t, 
W(wo,  OfI)  =  Uf(wo,  u, OfI,  z*).  (A.5) 
Then (3.2) will be the statement (A.5) for t = 0. 
To prove (A.5), note first that for all t, wo, 0f1,  (3.6) implies: 
Wf(W0, Of-I)=  {(1 -  ) u[ Wo,  (0-f,  0)]0+f3w+  I[  Wo, (0OfI  0,)]}dg, 
while (A.1) implies: 
Uj[W,  u, Of,  z*]  =  |{(1  -3)uJ[W0,  (0-f,  0)]0+PUf+1[W0,  u, (0O1,  0, z*)]}dg, 
Subtracting gives: 
IWf(Wo,  Of-I)  UI[Wo,  u,  0f-  Z*]3  sup6,po  IWft+?[WO,  (0f1-  0)]-  U1+I[W0,  u,  (01  0,l  Z*)]I- 
Since this inequality holds for all t and (wo, 0fI),  we have: 
sup(w,  orl)  I  wf(WO,  0f-I)  -  Uf[W0,  u,  0f,  Z*]I  _  f3S  sup(W0,  0+S-1  )  1W+S[WO,  0f+s  I]-Uf+S[WO,  U,  (Ot?sI,  z*)]I 
(A.6) 
for all s, t.  Then (3.1) and (3.5)  imply that as s ->oo the right-hand side of the inequality (A.6) goes to zero, 
which establishes  (A.5), and hence  (3.2) as well. 
Next, we show that the temporary incentive compatibility condition (3.7) implies the incentive compatibility 
condition  (3.3).  In fact, we verify that (3.7) implies (A.2), which by Lemma A.1 implies (3.3).  We will prove 
(A.2)  first for reporting strategies z that differ from the truth-telling strategy z* only in the first period, then 
use an induction to prove (A.2)  for strategies z that equal z* after N  periods, and finally verify (A.2) for all 
strategies z. 
From (3.7) and (A.5) we have, for any woE  D, r'0,  , and reporting history Zr: 
(1-0)Ur[W  ,(r,  0)]O0+1Ur+[WO,  U,(_r  0  Z*)]-(1I  3)Ur[WO,  (Zr,  0)]0+  Ur+I[WO,  U, (Zr,  OZ)], 
-  (A.7) 
for all 0, 0 c 0.  Now let zN  denote a reporting strategy that is arbitrary  for N periods, followed by truth-telling 
thereafter.  As an induction hypothesis,  assume that for some value of  N  and for all  wo, r, and Zr E Or?I 
(1  f3)Ur[WO,  (Zr  0)]0+3Ur+1[WO,  U,  (Zr  0  Z*)]-(1  -3)Ur[WO,  (Zr  0)]0+3Ur+[WO,  U,  (Zr,  0,  Z)] 
(A.8) 
for all  ZN  and all 0, 0cz.  For N=0,  this is (A.7).  We wish to show that (A.8) holds at N+1.  From (A.1), 
Ur[wo,  U,  (Zr,  0,  z  )]  =  L  {(1-_)Ur+[W0,  (Zr,  0,  Z0  ())]O+Ur+2[  WO,  U,  (9r ,  z  (0),  z  )]}dij 450  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
where z"'1(0)  denotes  the first coordinate  of the reporting strategy zN+I  and  zN  denotes  its continuation. 
Thus ZN,  involves truth-telling after N  periods.  By the induction hypothesis (A.8), the integrand on the right 
is maximized by setting ZoN+1(0) =  0  and ZN,  =  z*.  Hence: 
Ur+i[W0  U(Zr,  0,  {(1P-i)Ur+i[wo,(Zr,  0,0)]0+f3  Ur+2[WO,  U(r  0,  0,Z*)]}dI 
=  Ur+1[W0  U,  (Zr  0,  z)] 
for all 0.  It follows  that: 
(1-  )Ur[W0,  (,Zr 0)]0+38Ur+1[W0,  U,  (eZr, 6 z  )] 
?  (1-f)Ur[[wO  ,Zr  0)(]0+3Ur+[W0,  U,  (Zr  0  z*)] 
_ (1-  (A)Ur[W0(r  0)]0+P8Ur+[W0  U, (Ar  0,  Z*)] 
where the last inequality follows  from (A.7).  This proves (A.8) for all N. 
It remains to be shown that there are no reporting strategies that have infinitely many false reports that 
violate (A.2). But if there were, the boundedness condition (3.1) implies that some strategy ZN  with N sufficiently 
large but finite would also violate  (A.2),  contradicting (A.8).  This completes the proof that (A.2) holds,  and 
hence that (3.3) holds. 
Finally, the proof that (3.4)  holds  is an application  of  (A.4),  used as in the proof of  Lemma 3.1.  This 
completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.  11 
Part 2: Proofs of Lemma 5.1, 5.2, 5.3  and 6.1 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. (Logarithmic Utility)  First, we show that the minimizing choice of r, h must be in 
a non-empty, compact subset of the constraint set defined by (5.3)  and (5.4).  The objective in Problem P is 
continuous, so this step establishes the existence of minimizing choices of ro, ho. Then we show that for these 
choices 
exp {r0(0)}dp. = a  exp {h0(0)}d/l.  (A.9) 
This second step establishes that Problem P is equivalent to a problem of minimizing a strictly convex objective, 
and thus that the minimizing choice  of ro, ho is unique. 
The subset of  R2n  defined by (5.3) and (5.4) is not compact, but the minimization in Problem P can be 
confined to  a compact set as follows.  Let (r*, h*)  be any choice  satisfying (5.3)-(5.4),  and consider the set 
A c  R defined by (5.3), (5.4) and the two inequalities Je  exp {r(0)}dg_ttcJef  exp {r*(0)}dd, and Jo exp {h(O)}du  c 
fe exp {h*(0)}d)u.  Clearly a minimum in Problem P must be attained in A.  The set A is evidently closed and 
the  co-ordinates  of  points  in  A  are bounded  above.  Then (5.3)  and the assumption  that all  0 values  have 
positive probability implies that all co-ordinates are also bounded below.  Hence A is compact and there is a 
point (r?, ho) that attains the minimum in Problem P. 
To  verify the  equality  (A.9),  note  that for any  constant  a, the  point  (r0(0)+a,  h0(0)-[(1-,13)/13]a) 
satisfies (5.3) and (5.4).  If equality does not hold, the constant a can be chosen (positive or negative) to yield 
a lower value to the objective function, contradicting the optimality of (r?, ho). The uniqueness of the minimizing 
value in Problem P now follows  from the strict convexity of exp {u}.  11 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. (CRRA  case with y<O  and CARA case).  The proof of Lemma 5.1 in the CRRA 
utility case with y < 0 and in the CARA utility case is the same as in the logarithmic case. 
In the case of CRRA utility with y > 0,  the proof needs to be modified as follows. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. (CRRA  case y>O).  In the CRRA case  with  y>0,  since  D=[0,oo)  and each  0 
occurs with positive probability, the constraint set defined by (5.3) and (5.4) is bounded both below and above, 
and is thus compact.  But, since  we must admit the possibility that r(0)  or h(0)  is equal to zero for some  0, 
we cannot use the method above to verify the obvious analogue to (A.9).  In this case, the following  method 
may be used to verify this equation. 
Assume, contrary to (A.9), that (r?, ho) satisfy the incentive constraints (5.3) and (5.4) and that ATKESON  &  LUCAS  ON  EFFICIENT  DISTRIBUTION  451 
Let  T(0) = 0,  h(0) = 1/13, so  that  (f, h)  satisfy  the  incentive  constraints  (5.3)  and  (5.4).  Define  rA  = 
(1-A)r?+Ar,  hA=(1-A)ho+Ah  for Ac[0,  1].  Since the incentive constraints (5.3) and (5.4) are convex, these 
functions also satisfy the incentive constraints.  For any value of A  C  (0, 1), we have 
i [r?(0)1'1Idg  >  [r  (  0)  ]'/  du. 
By continuity, for sufficiently small values of A, we have 
[  [ro  (0)  11yli  >y  a  [hA(0)]'1Yd1i. 
Thus, (r?, ho) cannot minimize the objective in Problem P.  This proves in the CRRA case with y > 0, that the 
obvious analogue to (A.9) holds at the choice of (r?, ho) that minimize the objective in Problem P. 
To prove Lemma 5.2, we require the following  lemma. 
Lemma A.3. (Logarithmic Utility  Case).  Let C(u)  = exp (u),  D = (-oo,  oo), and qp(41) = a JD  C(w)dqi  < 
+oo.  Iff?  (w, 0)  and go(w, 0)  attain the minimum in (4.4) given a,  then 
Q  Cf(w,  0)]d1idq = at  C[g(w,  0)]dtLdq,.  (A.1I0) 
Proof: (Logarithmic Utility Case).  To verify the equality (A.10), note that, for any constant a, the point 
(f?(w, 0) + a, go(w, 0) -[(1-  f3)/f3]a]  satisfies (4.2) and (4.3).  If equality (A.I0)  does not hold, the constant a 
can be chosen  (positive  or negative)  to yield a lower value to the objective function  (4.4),  contradicting the 
optimality of (f?,  g).  11 
Proof ofLemma A.3 (CRRA utility  case y > O).  In this case D = [0, oo). Since we must admit the possibility 
that f(w,  0) or go(w, 0) is equal to zero for some (w, 0), we cannot use the method above to verify (A.1O). In 
this case, the same method used to verify (A.9) may be used to verify (A.10).1I 
Proof of Lemma A.3 (CRRA  utility case y > O) and CARA utility.  In this case D = (-oo, 0).  In the case 
of CARA utility, since the function  C bounded neither above nor below, we must add the assumption that we 
consider only distributions  qi which satisfy ID C(w)dqiI < +00.  Since we must admit the possibility that, for 
some  0 E 0  sup,f?(w,  0) = 0 or sup,, go(w, 0) = 0,  we cannot use the methods above to verify (A.10). 
In this case,  we verify that, in fact, there must exist some set  Do c  D  with  p(DO)  > 0 such that for all 
0 c 0,  sup fo( w, 0) < 0  and sup go( w, 0) < 0,  where the suprema are taken over w c Do.  After having argued 
this, we then can observe that, for any constant a, the point f, g with f(w,  0) =f?(w,  0), g(w, 0) = go(w, 0) for 
w c D-Do,  and f  (w, 0) =fo(w,  0) + a, g(w, 0) = go(w, 0) -  [(1 -/3)//3]a  for w c Do satisfies (4.2) and (4.3).  If 
equality (A.10)  does not hold,  since  qi(D)  > 0, the constant a can be chosen  (positive or negative) to yield a 
lower value to the objective function  (4.4), contradicting the optimality of (fO,  go). 
We verify that there must exist some set Do c  D,  qi/(DO)  > 0, such that, for all 0 cz  , supf?  (w, 0) < 0 and 
sup go(w, 0) < 0,  where the suprema are taken over w c Do as follows.  Suppose the contrary, i.e. that for all 
Do _  D with ip(DO)  > 0, for some  0 c 0,  sup fo(w,  0) = 0 or sup go(w, 0) = 0, where the suprema are taken over 
w  c Do.  Define the function  mo: D x 0 -  D x  O  by 
m?(w,  0) =  max [fo(w,  0), go(w, 0)] 
and m:  D e  D by m(w) =  maxo,6, mo(w, 0).  Define an increasing set of functions mn  D -  D by mn(w)  =  m(w) 
if m (w)  -/  n and mn  (w)  =1/  n otherwise.  Let Dn CD  be the set of w for which m  (w)  1/  n.  Our hypothesis 
implies that  p(Dn) = 0.  Thus, JD  mn(w)dqi  = I/n,  for all n, and then, in the limit, 
|  m(w)di  =  0.  (A.11) 
We now proceed to prove our result by contradicting (A.ll).  For each 0 CZ , let AO  c  D  be that set of  w C D 
such thatf(w,  0)?g(w,  0).  Since IJDC(w)dqil<+oo,  we have that the two terms in (A.10) are finite. 
J  Clm(w,  0)]dq,=  C[f?(w, 0)]dI+j  C[g?(w,  0)]dip<+oo 
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for all 0 c 0.  Since 0  is finite and each 0 occurs with positive probability, we have that JD C[m(w)]d  < +oo. 
By Jensen's inequality, JDm(w)  d,<O,  which contradicts (A.11), and we are done.  11 
Proof of Lemma 5.2. (Logarithmic utility).  As a consequence  of Lemma A.3, we may rewrite Problem T 
when Cp(f) = afDC  (w)d4  as 
minfg  C[f(w,  0)d/.d4  DX0 
subject to the incentive constraints (4.2),  (4.3), and the constraint 
J  C[f(w, 0)]dtdqi fa{  C[g(w, 0)]dgd4/.  (A.12) 
Sufficient conditions  for (f g)  to solve this Problem T are that there exist a number A  > 0  such that, for each 
w c D, f, g minimizes 
{(1  -A)C[f(w,  0)] + AaC[g(w,  Offldg 
subject to the incentive constraints (4.2), and (4.3), and such that 
At l  C[f(w,  0)]dp_dif -a  C[g(w,  0)]dlid/  }  =0. 
By (A.9), the values of (r?, ho) that solve Problem P (in the logarithmic utility case) minimize Jo exp (r(0))dg 
subject to the incentive constraints (5.3),  (5.4), and the constraint that 
exp (r(0))d,_  aj  exp (h(0))dg. 
Then, by Lemma 5.1 and the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, there exists a A-' 0 such that ro, ho minimizes 
f{(1-A)  exp (r(0))+Aa  exp (h(0))}dg 
subject to the incentive constraints (5.3), and (5.4), and satisfies 
Al{exp  (r(0))  -  a  exp (h(0))}dg.t = 0. 
It is clear that A  > 0.  It follows that A and the functions (f?, go) defined in the hypothesis of the lemma satisfy 
sufficient conditions  to solve  Problem T.  (The proof is similar in the cases of CRRA and CARA utility.)  11 
Proof of Lemma 5.3.  The function +(a)  is continuous by the Theorem of the Maximum.  We verify that 
k(a,)  '  a_ and  k(1)  1. This plus the continuity of  k will ensure the existence of a fixed point of k in [a,,  1]. 
The constant functions  r(0) = h(0) = 0 are feasible  for Problem P, and for a = 1 they yield the value  1. 
Hence  4(1)-'  1. 
For any value of a, the solution  +(a)  to Problem P must be greater than or equal to the solution of the 
same minimum problem with the incentive constraints (5.4) discarded.  The solution of this latter problem in 
the logarithmic utility case is readily calculated to be attained at: 
exp (r(0))  = AO  and  exp (h(0))=-, 
a 
where A = ap exp { -(1  -f3)E[0  log (0)]}.  Inserting either solution into the objective function yields +(a)  _ A. 
At a = ac, this inequality is: 
0(ac)?-  exp { -,fE[0  log (0)]}  exp { -  (1 -,f)E[0  log (0)]} = a,. 
The proof of this point is similar in the cases of CRRA and CARA utility. 
We can verify that the fixed point of  k in the interval [ac,  aa]  is unique by the following  argument.  Let 
a'>  a  and apply the result from Lemma (6.1) that at the choice of (r?, ho) which solve  Problem P, 
+(a) = |  exp [r(0; a)]dpg = aJ  exp [h(0; a)]dpg ATKESON  &  LUCAS  ON  EFFICIENT  DISTRIBUTION  453 
(in the logarithmic utility case) to obtain: 
OW)  -  +(a)  =  a'  exp [h(o;  a')]d,  -a  {  exp [h(o;  a)]dg 
?(a'-a)  a 
a 
since (r0(O; a),  h0(O; a))  is feasible for Problem P at a'.  Moreover, the inequality must hold strictly since the 
minimum at a' is unique.  Hence 4 has at most one fixed point.  11 
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